In recent years the increase in the divorce rate in many advanced countries and the predominance of female-headed families among the poor has generated much interest in the relationship between divorce and the welfare of mothers and children. In this paper I will review a small body of economic literature which has been recently developed in order to analyze the economic consequence of divorce on the welfare of fathers, mothers and children under alternative behavioral assumptions. Important economic and econometric issues arise from an analysis of welfare in non intact households as compared with intact households. In particular the focus is on the role that institutions play in post-divorce arrangements and important implications concerning policies for child support, custody, and visitation.
the direct costs involved for lawyers, as well as house moving costs involved in a separation resources reduces available. Thirdly, the wage rate of the custodial parent (in most cases the mother) is lower than the wage of the non-custodian. Finally, and more importantly, the non-residential parent (generally the father) contribute to their children less after separation in terms of income and time.
Most research has focused on this last issue, which seems to be the most important factor of the loss of welfare for mothers and children after divorce. Statistical evidence shows that divorced fathers (even those who are better off) fail to support their children at the same level to which they were accustomed during marriage. In spite of child support laws and enforcement, the compliance rate with child support orders is still very low and a significant proportion of children entitled to child support receive nothing.
Until a few years ago this phenomenon has been predominantly studied by sociologists, psychologists and social workers. Only recently have economists analyzed the economic consequences of marital instability. A first stream of literature has focused on how institutions regulating divorce outcomes affect women's behaviour: Becker (1981), Weiss and Willis (1993), Lafarrere (2001), Grossbard-Shetchman et al. (2002) .
Other economic studies have focused on children's welfare (Haveman and Wolfe 1994; Browning 1992) . Most of the research has analyzed the consequence of family dissolution for children outcomes in terms of their educational attainment. Children and young adults who live in a single parent family complete less education than those who have always lived in an intact two parent family. The dissolution of a family typically lowers resources available for investments in children and their socio-economic attainments as adults. Other studies focus on the long term effect on the labor market outcomes, partnership dissolution, early childbearing, distress and smoking (Hernandez et al. 1996; Ermisch and Francesconi 2001; Hill et al. 2001) .
In this paper we consider children welfare in terms of financial contribution from the parents, direct expenditures and time spent with them (even if not in all studies they are directly observable). The issue of the welfare decline of children after divorce is crucial especially in the US and the UK, where the number of children in poverty caused by divorce has grown more than elsewhere. In these countries more than in others after divorce a high proportion of children lose contact with non residential parents (because of higher mobility, smaller role of the extended family). Because of the growing importance of these phenomena, it seems fundamental to focus on how institutions can intervene to reduce the negative impact of divorce on children's welfare (in terms of available income and time with the parents).
A limited but interesting field of literature has been developed, combining elements of bargaining theory and microeconomic analysis. We intend to examine how economists have studied the role of institutions in divorced households, illustrating important methodological and empirical issues. In Sect. 2 we present descriptive evidence on divorce rates, child support and welfare conditions of divorce households in various countries, illustrating how the outcome of divorce can be different in contexts characterized by different institutions. In Sect. 3 we describe several methodological, theoretical and empirical differences between non-intact households and intact ones. One of the most important differences has to do with the fact that
